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1. Introduction 33 
Innovative operations are recognized as critical determinants of economic recovery and sustained 34 
competitiveness by scholars, practitioners and policy makers (Pisano and Shih, 2012; BMBF, 2013; 35 
SMLC, 2014). A central domain of innovative operations is technological process innovation (TPI) 36 
(Dodgson et al., 2008; Schallock, 2010). TPI can enable increased production yield, lower production 37 
costs (Browning and Heath, 2009), improved product and service quality (Reichstein and Salter, 38 
2006), operational flexibility (Upton, 1997), controllability (Zelbst et al., 2012; Gerwin, 1988), 39 
environmental sustainability (Kleindorfer et al., 2005), and accelerated time-to-market (Hayes et al., 40 
2005).  41 
Despite the importance of TPI for organizational competitiveness, relatively little is known about the 42 
development and implementation of new processes (Frishammar et al., 2012; Hayes et al., 2005; 43 
Lager, 2011). Compared with product innovation, research has shown that firms seek TPI for different 44 
reasons at different points in time to remain competitive amidst changing market environments 45 
(Adner and Levinthal, 2001; Anderson and Tushman, 1991; Utterback and Abernathy, 1975). 46 
Managing process development on the operational level has received far less attention in the literature 47 
than product development (Frishammar et al., 2013), although it is equally ‘enabled through planned, 48 
structured, and formalized work processes’ (Frishammar et al., 2012).  49 
Existing research has identified different stages of the process innovation lifecycle (ILC) (e.g. 50 
Kurkkio et al., 2011; Clark and Wheelwright, 1993; Voss, 1992). Early studies in this context do not 51 
distinguish between product and process innovation and suggest the same approaches for both 52 
(Utterback, 1971; Hayes et al., 1988). Others treat process innovation as a sub-component of product 53 
development or highlight the complementarities between both (Hayes et al., 2005; Wheelwright and 54 
Clark, 1994). Clark and Wheelwright (1993), for example, advanced an approach in which companies 55 
create products and production processes conjointly through iterations of design-build-test cycles, in 56 
which both are conceptualized and tested until a final design is reached. Similarly, Hayes et al. (2005) 57 
discuss TPI as an enabler of competitive advantage and complement to product innovation, thus 58 
making it pivotal to synchronize product and process development. Despite providing important 59 
insights, such contributions do not adequately account for issues specifically related to process 60 
development along the ILC.  61 
 TPI is a distinctive organizational phenomenon characterised by a firm internal locus and underlying 62 
components such as mutual adaptation of technology and organization, technological change, 63 
organizational change, and systemic impact (Gopalakrishnan et al. 1999; Lager, 2011; Reichstein and 64 
Salter, 2006). In order to treat TPI as a distinct unit of analysis and generate detailed insight on 65 
challenges companies face and capabilities they require, such components need to be investigated 66 
more closely (Becheikh et al., 2006; Lu and Botha, 2006). Existing work on TPI typically focuses on 67 
identifying activities and sequences in the ILC (Lager, 2011; Voss, 1992; Kurkkio et al., 2011, Hayes 68 
et al., 2005). Although such studies occasionally refer to specific TPI components, they do not 69 
explicitly show how these are addressed at different stages of the ILC. Therefore, a gap remains with 70 
regards to understanding the content of the ILC as constituted by TPI components.  71 
Addressing this gap, we explore TPI from a lifecycle perspective with specific attention towards the 72 
TPI components. We focus our study on large manufacturing companies, in which TPI affects a large 73 
number of interconnected functions and departments. Our guiding question is: How do large 74 
manufacturing companies develop and implement new processes along the different stages of the 75 
innovation lifecycle?  76 
We extend prior research by adopting an ILC perspective for the investigation of four TPI 77 
components. Building on empirical evidence from five large manufacturing companies, we elicit the 78 
content of mutual adaptation, technological change, organizational change, and systemic impact 79 
management across the stages of the ILC and identify patterns of asymmetric adaptation. 80 
The paper is structured as follows: section two develops our conceptual framework. Section three 81 
presents the research methodology. Section four presents the results. Section five discusses our 82 
findings and concludes with implications for theory and practice. 83 
2. Theoretical background and framework  84 
The theoretical background of our study is informed by operations management (OM) and innovation 85 
management (IM) literature. The purpose of our framework is to establish categories in which to 86 
explore the content of key TPI components across the ILC.  87 
TPI is defined as the development and implementation of new or significantly improved operations, 88 
including production, product development, and administration, which involves the introduction of 89 
new technology (Meyers et al. 1999; Oke et al., 2007). TPI is a broad concept, involving the 90 
introduction of new hardware and software technology (Carrillo and Gaimon, 2002; Zelbst et al., 91 
2012), but also changes to organizational structures and procedures (Edquist et al., 2001; Parikh and 92 
Joshi, 2005). Previous studies in OM have demonstrated the importance of technological and 93 
 organizational change for operations improvement, such as the implementation of RFID technology or 94 
restructuring purchasing processes (Zelbst et al., 2012; Parikh and Joshi, 2005). 95 
Despite this analytical distinction, TPI typically encompasses both technological and organizational 96 
changes (Reichstein and Salter, 2006). Process development, thus, needs to account for technological 97 
change as well as associated jobs, procedures and work activities (Slack et al., 2013). Particularly in 98 
manufacturing industries, the complementarity between technological and organizational change has 99 
been highlighted (Jayanthi and Sinha, 1998). Although technological and organizational change may 100 
have positive effects on firm performance independent of each other (Georgantzas and Shapiro, 101 
1993), congruency between both is commonly found to be a critical determinant of successful TPI 102 
(Battisti and Stoneman, 2010; Ettlie et al., 1984). Gerwin (1988) emphasized the need for 103 
complementary skills, support systems, procedures, and social structures to realize the implementation 104 
of new computer-aided-manufacturing technology. More recently, Cantamessa et al. (2012) discussed 105 
the importance of fit between new technology, existing IT infrastructure, job performance 106 
requirements, and operators’ skills, for realizing new processes through the adoption of product-107 
lifecycle-management technology. Companies therefore face the challenge of managing mutual 108 
adaptation of new technology and existing organization (Leonard-Barton, 1988; Tyre and Hauptman, 109 
1992). As processes are embedded within a broader organizational context, changes to technology or 110 
organization may invoke further changes (Gopalakrishnan et al., 1999). Modifying individual process 111 
components often results in changes to the components’ periphery, making systemic impact a central 112 
aspect of TPI (Kurkkio et al. 2011). 113 
This brief review identifies four components underlying TPI: mutual adaptation; technological 114 
change; organizational change; and systemic impact. We elaborate on these components in the 115 
following sections.  116 
2.1 Process innovation components 117 
Mutual adaptation. Congruency between technology and organization is key to successful TPI (Ettlie 118 
et al., 1984). From the outset of an innovation project, new technology is unlikely to fit with a 119 
company’s existing organization (Tyre and Hauptman, 1992). Mutual adaptation refers to the 120 
reconfiguration of new technology and existing organization to achieve a fit between both (Leonard-121 
Barton, 1988). Change may relate to the technology’s architecture as well as existing operations, 122 
routines, skills, and support systems that constitute the organization (Gerwin, 1988; Tyre and 123 
Hauptman, 1992). Mutual adaptation has primarily been studied as an emergent phenomenon during 124 
and after technology installation (Leonard-Barton, 1988; Majchrzak et al., 2000; Tyre and Orlikowski, 125 
1994). While the installation of new technology marks a critical point for the management of process 126 
innovation (Voss, 1992), the stages prior to installation are equally important as they comprise the 127 
 planning and development of TPI (Kurkkio et al., 2011; Frishammar et al., 2013). We, therefore, 128 
explore how companies address and manage mutual adaptation throughout the entire ILC. 129 
Technological change. Technology refers to hardware and software that support the transformation of 130 
inputs into outputs in a company’s enabling and core processes (Carrillo and Gaimon, 2002; 131 
Schallock, 2010). The introduction of new process technology has been identified as an enabler of 132 
efficiency improvements and cost reductions in production and R&D (Dodgson et al., 2008; Zelbst et 133 
al., 2012). Technology development and implementation is not a simplistic task. Technology needs to 134 
be acquired or developed internally and fit to the context in which it is implemented (Cooper, 2007; 135 
Lager and Frishammar, 2010; Tyre and Hauptman, 1992). This invokes equivocality (Frishammar et 136 
al., 2011) as well as technological, financial, and social uncertainty, because the technology and its 137 
consequences are initially not fully understood (Gerwin, 1988; Stock and Tatikonda, 2004). In this 138 
study we seek to understand how issues of technological change are addressed and managed 139 
throughout the ILC. To document the management of technological change, we refer to activities, 140 
outputs, and problems that relate a technology’s relative advantage, complexity, compatibility, and 141 
communicability (Rogers, 2003; Tornatzky and Klein, 1982). 142 
Organizational change. Organizational change refers to new ways of organizing work (Edquist et al., 143 
2001). This includes the development and introduction of changed organizational structures, 144 
administrative systems, management methods, or existing processes and capabilities (Damanpour and 145 
Aravind, 2012; Carrillo and Gaimon, 2002). Organizational change can pertain to the administrative 146 
functions within the company, for example, human resources or purchasing (Damanpour and Aravind, 147 
2012) as well as work organization in core operations, such as production (Birkinshaw et al., 2008; 148 
Edquist et al., 2001; OECD, 2005). Prominent examples of organizational change include just-in-time 149 
production and total-quality-management (Womack et al., 1990). Although organizational change is 150 
closely intertwined with technological change (Edquist et al., 2001; Georgantzas and Shapiro, 1993), 151 
its purpose and consequences are often less evident to internal stakeholders, making it more difficult 152 
to legitimize and implement (Damanpour and Aravind, 2012). Birkinshaw et al. (2008) identify three 153 
reasons why organizational change is challenging: it is often tacit in nature and difficult to observe, 154 
define, and identify; companies often lack relevant expertise; and it causes ambiguity and uncertainty 155 
amongst stakeholders. The coordination of such change has the potential to create conflict within the 156 
organization, either due to the alteration of roles, power, and status, or because of discrepancies in 157 
expectations and requirements of different stakeholders (Gerwin, 1988). To this background, we seek 158 
to understand how companies coordinate organizational changes throughout the ILC.  159 
Systemic impact. Processes consist of inter-connected components that affect multiple functions 160 
within the company (Gopalakrishnan et al., 1999; Hayes et al., 2005; Kurkkio et al., 2011). Systemic 161 
impact implies that an innovation can only be realized if it is integrated with its broader system 162 
 (Chesbrough and Teece, 2003). According to Gatignon et al. (2002), systemic impact emerges from 163 
changes in the linking of subsystems (architectural) or changes in subsystems themselves (modular). 164 
Systems modularity explains the configuration of subsystems and degree of coupling between them. 165 
A modular system comprises of units whose subsystems are strongly connected internally, but weakly 166 
connected externally (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Gomes and Dahab, 2010). Modular systems can be 167 
designed independently, but still function as an integrated whole. Thus, depending on the modularity 168 
of the organizational system, changes in internal processes can invoke system-wide impacts. Such 169 
impacts can render established systems obsolete, leading to the reformulation of existing roles, 170 
relationships, and mental models (Tyre and Hauptman, 1992). Systemic impact may not be evident 171 
from the outset of an innovation project. Using new information, however, often requires costly 172 
revisions of earlier decisions and designs (Terwiesch and Loch, 1999). To this background, we seek to 173 
explore how companies manage and cope with systemic impact throughout the ILC.   174 
2.2 Process innovation lifecycle 175 
Existing literature provides several ILC models, which outline different stages and activities for the 176 
creation of TPI. Aggregating earlier work, we propose four ILC stages. Ideation describes the initial 177 
generation of process candidates and is triggered by process related performance gaps (Gerwin, 1988). 178 
Adoption comprises all activities related to facilitating and making investment decisions. Concept 179 
development and preliminary project descriptions aid decision making (Frishammar et al., 2011; 180 
Kurkkio et al., 2011; Lager, 2011). Preparation comprises technology development and 181 
organizational change planning (Gerwin, 1988; Tyre and Hauptman, 1992; Voss, 1992). Installation 182 
refers to process implementation, including technology set-up and organizational change introduction. 183 
Furthermore, we distinguish between task forces (process designers; project management), decision 184 
makers (higher-level managers; authorizing investments), and operators (process users; technical and 185 
administrative functions) as important stakeholders, but only adopt a task forces’ perspective. Figure 1 186 
depicts our research framework. 187 
********************* 188 
Insert Figure 1 here 189 
********************* 190 
3. Methodology 191 
We adopt an exploratory case-research design because of the nascent state of theory; we seek to 192 
answer a ‘how-question’; and we aim to capture the content of and relationships between TPI 193 
components at different ILC stages. Such objectives are best addressed by case-research (Yin, 2003). 194 
We use multiple cases to corroborate findings and dissociate emerging patterns from firm specific 195 
 circumstances, thus generating more analytically generalizable theory (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 196 
2007; Eisenhardt, 1989).  197 
3.1 Empirical setting 198 
The study focuses on large manufacturing companies from different industries. Large, manufacturing 199 
companies typically have strong technological competences and make substantial investments in TPI 200 
(Cabagnols and Le Bas, 2002). Moreover, they are often characterized by departmentalization and 201 
hierarchical structures that impede flexibility (Pavitt, 1991). This constitutes a challenging 202 
environment for process development and implementation, and provides a rich grounding for our 203 
research. We selected five companies according to criteria such as investments in TPI, main business 204 
in manufacturing, and number of employees. Purposeful case selection increases the chances of 205 
capturing valid insights (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). To facilitate replication (Yin, 2003), we 206 
distinguished between companies reporting on the development of enabling processes or core 207 
processes (Table 1).  208 
********************* 209 
Insert Table 1 here 210 
********************* 211 
3.2 Framework development 212 
The conceptual framework provided relevant categories for our research and was used to guide data 213 
collection, analysis, and integration with existing literature (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 214 
1994). The framework aggregates different streams of OM and IM literature. It was discussed with 215 
selected members of the case companies, as well as other practitioners and academic peers. This led to 216 
minor refinements and increased construct validity. 217 
3.3. Data collection  218 
We conducted semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with multiple, knowledgeable representatives 219 
from all five companies. During a four month period and 55 sessions, we collected 91.5 hours of 220 
recorded interview data. Interviews were retrospective and focused on the respondents’ general 221 
experiences with regards to various TPI projects. To address potential issues of ex-post sense-making 222 
and selective memory, we interviewed numerous informants and captured a variety of experience. 223 
This decreases the likelihood of convergent retrospective sense-making and strengthens data validity 224 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Visits to manufacturing facilities in four companies provided us 225 
with additional opportunities to gain first-hand insights on TPI development and testing. During these 226 
occasions we took notes to capture our impressions. This was further supplemented with extensive 227 
 secondary documentation and follow-up discussions to inquire about particular findings and increase 228 
construct validity through triangulation. 229 
3.4 Data analysis  230 
Data were initially coded according to a ‘start list’ of codes based on the categories of our research 231 
framework (Miles and Huberman, 1994). We looked at which TPI components (PRV 1-4) the data 232 
could be coded and at which ILC stage (ILC 1-4) it had been discussed. We conducted several rounds 233 
of iterative coding, during which we created and eliminated emerging sub-categories of our 234 
framework. This allowed us to populate the framework with relevant content in each category for 235 
every company in our study. The results of this within-case analysis were logged in extensive data 236 
tables, as suggested by Miles and Hubermann (1994). We then created new tables, compiling the 237 
relevant data for each framework category from all cases under the same label, while maintaining 238 
references to the original sources. These tables were used to compare the findings at each category 239 
across cases, enforce rigor, and overcome initial impressions and premature conclusions (Eisenhardt, 240 
1989). On this basis we identified similarities and differences across cases, from which we formulated 241 
initial working propositions and identified the content for further discussion (Eisenhardt, 1989).  242 
4. Results 243 
This section documents cross-case patterns relating to the TPI components at different ILC stages. 244 
Figure 2 provides a summary of the key results across the ILC. 245 
********************* 246 
Insert Figure 2 here 247 
********************* 248 
4.1. Ideation 249 
Mutual adaptation. All companies reported an initial focus on developing or modifying new 250 
technology to address performance gaps. Although task force members generally considered 251 
organizational change necessary for TPI, the initial appraisal of existing technological infrastructure, 252 
processes, and hierarchical structures, serves as a frame for developing and implementing new 253 
processes. Anticipation of potential opposition against organizational change and the expectation to 254 
deliver solutions with a good chance of realization encourage the task forces to devise process 255 
descriptions with a bias towards adapting new technology rather than the existing organization. 256 
RailCo and ChasCo, nonetheless, clarified that with the introduction of standard technologies, an 257 
early focus on identifying organizational change is necessary to realize and accentuate the benefits of 258 
standard technologies, such as cost efficient updates, maintenance, and high modularity. 259 
 Technological change. Depending on market availability, the task forces either search for off-the-260 
shelf technologies or technological components for further internal development. We found that the 261 
task forces use ‘potential compatibility’ and ‘relative advantage’ as primary evaluation attributes. 262 
While they considered accurate specification of these attributes as highly desirable, achieving 263 
accuracy is challenging, as neither technology nor the expectations towards it are well understood at 264 
this stage. Consequently, communicability is generally considered to be low. The case of EleCo, 265 
however, showed that limited availability of existing technological solutions and a focus on risk 266 
mitigating incremental changes enabled the task force to invest in early research to determine 267 
compatibility and relative advantage more accurately. This also facilitated a slight increase in 268 
communicability.  269 
Organizational change. All task forces stated that potential organizational change should be 270 
considered during ideation, yet they typically reported that only minor attention was paid to it. 271 
Organizational change was perceived to create more internal opposition and coordination efforts, 272 
especially in the context of complex structures and relationships in large companies. Moreover, the 273 
task forces found it difficult to understand necessary organizational changes early on. Consistent with 274 
the results on mutual adaptation and technological change during this stage, we found that the existing 275 
organization served as a frame of reference in which to evaluate potential new technologies. 276 
Systemic impact. All five companies recognized early systemic impact assessment as important for 277 
identifying potential costs and benefits of process ideas. If costs of systemic impact are perceived to 278 
outweigh their benefits, ideas are excluded from further investigation. Most task forces, however, 279 
explicitly reported that the limited specification of new processes made it difficult to determine their 280 
systemic impact. This may even lead to systemic impact being neglected (RailCo). Nevertheless, 281 
potential impact can be tentatively described by gathering feedback from key operators with sufficient 282 
tacit and explicit knowledge of existing operations.  283 
4.2 Adoption 284 
Mutual adaptation. The task forces in most cases reported that decision makers were generally willing 285 
to adopt technological and organizational change, as long as the respective benefits were clearly 286 
articulated. RailCo and ChasCo suggested that costs and effort of achieving a fit between technology 287 
and organization were the main criteria for decision making. Still, this was considered easier to 288 
determine for technological change. Nevertheless, the companies emphasized that organizational 289 
change was particularly important for decision making on the introduction of standard technologies. 290 
In contrast, the results show that decision making favours technological change for internally 291 
developed technologies to facilitate core processes (e.g. production) (EleCo; ChasCo). 292 
 Technological change. Technological change was highly important to decision making in all cases. 293 
We found that technological concept development either referred to the presentation of technologies 294 
by external vendors (CarCo; RailCo; DefCo; ChasCo) or prototype development for company-specific 295 
solutions (EleCo, ChasCo). EleCo and ChasCo explicitly highlighted the importance of systematic 296 
and early technology evaluation to aid adoption. This comprises pre-studies to minimize uncertainty 297 
with regards to compatibility and relative advantage of internally developed solutions (EleCo) or 298 
evaluation criteria for vendor solutions (ChasCo). Common thread to decision making was an 299 
emphasis on compatibility. We found that several cases emphasized the importance of future 300 
compatibility, which they estimate in terms of cost and effort of further technology change or 301 
modification once in operation to fit with future developments (e.g. producing a new product). The 302 
relative advantage of new technology in terms of improving production efficiency, output quality, and 303 
safety, was also central to the investment decision. The task forces, however, expressed difficulty in 304 
estimating relative advantage precisely given limited technological understanding. As such, 305 
communicability is equally limited. EleCo and ChasCo were exceptions due to the early emphasis on 306 
concept development, which increased technological understanding and communicability.  307 
Organizational change. Relative to the ideation stage, organizational change gains importance during 308 
adoption because concept development increases clarity on the potential functions that may be 309 
affected. Nevertheless, all task forces stated that such considerations were often severely discounted 310 
in favour of technology change. The companies reported it as a challenge to coordinate organizational 311 
change, especially if different stakeholders had different expectations and requirements. The 312 
implementation of standard solutions in particular required significant effort from task forces to 313 
persuade relevant stakeholders to agree to and support adoption. Uncertainty, however, makes 314 
advocating organizational change difficult. It is, for example, difficult to gather support for 315 
eliminating specific roles and functions when their future relevance is not understood clearly (CarCo).  316 
Systemic impact. All task forces considered systemic impact assessment important. Tentative process 317 
specification and complex organizational structures make it difficult to carry out impact assessment. 318 
Differences thus emerged in the extent to which impact assessment is included in decision making. In 319 
some cases (CarCo; RailCo) the added complexity of considering systemic impact often leads 320 
decision makers to ignore it. In contrast other companies (EleCo; ChasCo) explicitly include systemic 321 
impact in decisions making. This was particularly emphasized in the context of processes linked to 322 
core operations. In EleCo, for example, the effect of a new process is always assessed thoroughly to 323 
prevent the disruption of production processes during implementation. 324 
4.3 Preparation 325 
Mutual adaptation. Mutual adaptation was considered in every case, yet a general preference for 326 
developing or modifying technology to fit with existing organization emerged consistently. Increasing 327 
 resistance against organizational change among operators encouraged the task forces to follow this 328 
pattern. The task forces in CarCo, RailCo, DefCo, and ChasCo pointed out that the limited 329 
adaptability of standard solutions was necessary in order not to impede the advantages of 330 
standardization. In this context, greater readiness for organizational adaptation was considered 331 
necessary. In contrast, EleCo and ChasCo (core) considered it desirable to articulate the firm specific 332 
capabilities and seek technological adaptation towards the existing organization when developing core 333 
technology internally.  334 
Technological change. During preparation technological change refers to the modification or 335 
development of a specific technology to enable a new process. This can include minor adaptations or 336 
developing additional functionalities to externally acquired technology as well as full scale 337 
proprietary technology development. While the aim is achieving a fit with the process description, 338 
compatibility was generally assessed relative to the operators’ expectations and requirements. All task 339 
forces reported that gathering operators’ acceptance was imperative to exploiting process innovation 340 
effectively. The task forces reported to shift communication efforts from decision makers to operators, 341 
in order to gather feedback on further developments, but also to address uncertainties when 342 
opportunities for substantial technological change were limited (CarCo; RailCo; DefCo; ChasCo). 343 
Communication, however, was still considered a major challenge across most cases. The main 344 
problem was the unfinished state of technology, which hindered communicability and observability. 345 
CarCo, for example, explained that if technology was communicated on an abstract level, operators 346 
might not understand it. At the same time, presenting unfinished technological solutions could 347 
constrain operators’ acceptance due to confusion or disappointment.  348 
Organizational change. Despite displaying a preference for technological change, several task forces 349 
reported that limited technological adaptability, process standardization across departments, and 350 
adoption of standard technologies made organizational change unavoidable. According to these task 351 
forces organizational change required coordination across multiple departments and functions. 352 
Coordination is particularly challenging when different stakeholders have conflicting interests. 353 
Moreover, the task forces typically experienced increasing opposition against organizational change 354 
during this stage. We found that it was easier to prepare and implement changes to existing work 355 
processes where people had to perform similar tasks slightly differently, rather than preparing and 356 
coordinating structural change, in which operators are given new functions and responsibilities 357 
(DefCo; EleCo; ChasCo). 358 
Systemic impact. We found that systemic impact becomes increasingly important. Detailed solution 359 
development reveals potential impacts more clearly. This is important for planning seamless process 360 
implementation without disrupting existing operations, while controlling for potential impact beyond 361 
immediately adjacent components throughout the organizational system. The task forces pointed out 362 
 that such systemic integration was central to the appropriation of process innovations, as it made 363 
processes uniquely fit the company and difficult to understand for outsiders. In order to realize such 364 
benefits, however, it is important to prepare for coherent adoption of the new process across all 365 
departments it affects. Expert review, simulation, and pilot studies help uncovering unanticipated 366 
impact prior to implementation. 367 
4.4 Installation  368 
Mutual adaptation. Unanticipated adaptation is generally necessary during this stage, yet time 369 
pressure, daily operations, limited resources, and clearly defined project boundaries restricts the 370 
opportunities for further change. EleCo explained that the main priority was keeping production 371 
running and addressing misalignments in core operations immediately. References across all cases 372 
corroborated this insight. To this background the task forces reported a tendency towards 373 
technological change, which required less funding, coordination, and time than organizational change. 374 
Remaining misalignments often result from discrepancies between task forces’ process description 375 
and operators’ enactments of new processes. Deploying additional training for capability development 376 
(e.g. for working with new machines, processes, and/or organizational structures) was consistently 377 
suggested as a powerful adaptation mechanism.  378 
Technological change. Similar experiences on technological change during installation were reported 379 
in all cases. Typically, new technology is installed and configured, then handed over to operators. At 380 
this stage, the technology needs to work in a real operations environment, which makes it crucial to 381 
accomplish compatibility with the organization, existing technological infrastructure and operators’ 382 
skills and expectations. Limited resources and finalized process design only allow for minor 383 
technological change. The task forces across all cases further agreed that one of the most critical 384 
determinants of successful technology introduction was the extent to which it was accepted and 385 
correctly applied by operators. Uncertainty and unintended coping mechanisms often result from the 386 
operators’ lack of technology understanding, which hinders the effective realization of the 387 
technology’s relative advantage. While task forces have developed a thorough technological 388 
understanding, complexity increases from the operators’ perspective. Therefore, the task forces aimed 389 
to shape operators’ attitude rather than changing technologies. High levels of communicability are 390 
therefore necessary during this stage to facilitate knowledge transfer from the task force to operators. 391 
In this regard, limited time for training due to daily operations is a common problem. 392 
Organizational change. All cases considered organizational change to be important. Yet, complex, 393 
historically grown structures make it difficult to implement it. While there were several references to 394 
hierarchical support for enforcing change, we found that structural change needed acceptance among 395 
the operators enacting the new process (CarCo; DefCo; ChasCo). Therefore, most task forces agreed 396 
that organizational change implementation mainly required addressing operators’ resistance. The task 397 
 forces also explained that further structural changes, such as changed responsibilities and reporting 398 
structures, required significantly more coordination than ad-hoc changes to the specification of task 399 
performances within existing organizational domains. The task forces in CarCo, DefCo, and ChasCo 400 
found that changes to task performance were relatively unproblematic when given sufficient training. 401 
Nevertheless, this may incur costly workarounds (RailCo).  402 
Systemic impact. The systemic impact of change becomes fully apparent during installation. Seamless 403 
integration largely depends on the work carried out in earlier stages. Managing systemic integration 404 
during installation is a delicate issue, as further change requires significant effort, cost, and time. As a 405 
precaution, it was mentioned in several cases that ‘emergency’ budgets and time for ad-hoc change 406 
scenarios should be reserved. Furthermore, simulation and mock-up environments or successive 407 
installation in different facilities are used to manage systemic integration. EleCo reported that flawless 408 
systemic integration was particularly important for core processes. If a new technology cannot be 409 
integrated with the existing technological infrastructure or operated by operators, it may disrupt the 410 
entire operations system, resulting in a lack of output quality or quantity. For less critical processes, 411 
the task forces reported that further changes could be postponed to follow-up projects.  412 
5. Discussion 413 
5.1 Adaptation prior to process implementation 414 
Our results suggest that mutual adaptation is an important conceptual perspective for outlining and 415 
selecting solutions during early ILC stages. During later stages adaptation is deliberately managed to 416 
resolve misalignments between technology, organization, and operators. Complementing earlier 417 
studies on mutual adaptation as an emergent phenomenon during and after implementation (Leonard-418 
Barton, 1988; Majchrzak et al., 2000; Tyre and Orlikowski, 1994), our findings document a deliberate 419 
process of adaptation occurring prior to implementation. This is particularly relevant given that there 420 
is generally limited opportunity for change once a new process becomes operational (Tyre and 421 
Orlikowski, 1994). Our findings therefore advocate a holistic perspective on process development and 422 
implementation, which comprises the practical development and implementation stages (Gerwin, 423 
1988; Hayes et al., 2005), but also the more conceptual and relatively unexplored ILC front-end 424 
(Kurkkio et al. 2011). 425 
5.2 Mutual adaptation as an asymmetric process 426 
Our findings suggest that mutual adaptation enfolds as an asymmetric process. Opposition against 427 
organizational change, substantial coordination efforts, and difficulty to understand necessary changes 428 
early on, create a preference for technological change within existing organizational structures and 429 
processes among task forces (cf. Birkinshaw et al., 2008; Damanpour and Aravind, 2012). As the 430 
 results clearly show that operators’ acceptance was critical to successful implementation, it is likely 431 
that task forces may expect greater implementation success when asymmetrically adapting new 432 
technology towards the existing organization. Our results, however, suggest that this tendency is 433 
moderated by the type of process that companies develop and the technology they adopt. We find that 434 
when companies develop proprietary technology for core processes (EleCo; ChasCo) that are unique 435 
to their operations, they seek to leverage the competences manifested in the existing technological 436 
infrastructure, processes, and operators’ skills (low standardization: more technology change, less 437 
organizational change). Conversely, we find that externally acquired standard technologies may 438 
facilitate efficiency gains through standardization and increased modularity in processes that are not 439 
directly related to the company’s core operations (CarCo; RailCo; DefCo; ChasCo). In this case, 440 
companies seek to exploit the expertise of external technology suppliers (Lager and Frishammar, 441 
2010; Rönnberg-Sjödin, 2013; Stock and Tatikonda, 2004). Across the ILC our results show that in 442 
order to do so the task forces restrict technological adaptation to leverage the benefits of 443 
standardization. This suggests that standard processes require overcoming preferences for technology 444 
change and maintaining the organizational status quo (high standardization: less technology change, 445 
more organizational change). In sum, we propose that mutual adaptation is an asymmetric process 446 
with the level of desired process standardization affecting the direction of asymmetry (Figure 3).  447 
********************* 448 
Insert Figure 3 here 449 
********************* 450 
5.3 Differences in managing technological change 451 
In line with earlier research, we document user involvement as imperative for preparing for 452 
developing transport systems (user interfaces), successful technology installation, and creating a fit 453 
between new technology and operators’ expectations (Cantamessa et al., 2012; Kurkkio et al., 2011; 454 
Leonard-Barton, 1988). Nevertheless, our findings indicate that limited communicability hinders 455 
operators’ involvement at various stages of the ILC. Our findings reveal that in response, task forces 456 
focus on a technology’s compatibility with the existing organization to reduce high levels of 457 
complexity that are characteristic of early stage technology development (Frishammar et al., 2011; 458 
Cooper, 2007). After pre-selection the expectations and requirements of the affected operators can 459 
increasingly be taken into consideration as a referent for compatibility. Therefore, the focus of 460 
communication increasingly shifts to operators as process development progresses. In this regard, our 461 
findings again highlight the differences between the implementation of externally acquired standard 462 
solutions (CarCo; RailCo; DefCo; ChasCo) and internally developed core technologies (EleCo; 463 
 ChasCo). Relatively less opportunity for technological change in standard technology adoption 464 
invokes more efforts to persuade operators to adopt necessary organizational changes.  465 
5.4 Limitations to organizational change  466 
Our results suggest that the existing organization is a known and explicable system to organizational 467 
stakeholders and significant uncertainty is involved in the introduction of change. Moreover, we 468 
found limited potential for task forces to enforce change top-down, as representatives from operating 469 
functions within manufacturing firms are often very powerful (cf. Shields and Malhotra, 2008). 470 
Internal opposition requires substantial coordination effort for organizational reconfiguration. When 471 
organizational change is unavoidable, our results indicate, it is relatively easier to convince operators 472 
to perform existing tasks in a slightly different fashion, rather than introducing new organizational 473 
structures or subsystems. We attribute this to the more technical nature of changing work activities, 474 
which can be demonstrated, trained, and more clearly expressed. Changes in the organization’s 475 
architecture represent more radical forms of innovation (Gatignon et al., 2002) and involve more 476 
social uncertainty with regards to the operators’ employment or authority status (Gerwin, 1988). 477 
5.5 Systemic impact assessment and integration  478 
We found that the task forces generally experience the systemic nature of processes as a key challenge 479 
of process innovation (Gopalakrishnan et al., 1999). Nevertheless, our results show significant 480 
differences in the ability to articulate systemic impacts moving from ideation stages to installation. In 481 
this regard, early investment in concept development and interaction with key operators who possess 482 
substantial tacit and explicit process knowledge enable systemic impact assessment along the ILC. 483 
While it was reported in some cases that systemic impacts can be addressed after process 484 
implementation, our findings concur with earlier research in showing that flawless systemic 485 
integration of new processes is imperative for core processes such as production (EleCo; ChasCo), in 486 
order not to interrupt existing operations that directly affect firm performance (O’Hara et al., 1993).  487 
6. Conclusions 488 
6.1 Theoretical contributions 489 
Our study contributes to the literature on new process development and implementation from a 490 
lifecycle perspective (e.g. Lager, 2011; Voss, 1992; Kurkkio et al., 2011, Hayes et al., 2005) by 491 
dissociating process innovation work with regards to four key components – mutual adaptation, 492 
technological change, organizational change, and systemic impact – across a generic ILC. While 493 
previous studies have empirically and conceptually identified activities, challenges, and sequences 494 
that constitute possible variations of ILCs, they have not explicitly accounted for different TPI 495 
components. Our study specifically uncovers the content of four central TPI components across the 496 
 ILC. In particular, our findings suggest that companies will follow asymmetric approaches to TPI 497 
development and implementation, favouring either technological or organizational change depending 498 
on the level of standardization desired. In the case of core processes, technology adaptation 499 
accentuates existing capabilities, whereas for enabling processes organizational change is necessary to 500 
exploit the benefits of standardization. The focus of our study on TPI components demonstrates the 501 
relevance of putting greater emphasis on the content of the variables that constitute TPI rather than 502 
documenting the sequence of activities within the ILC. We hope this encourages further studies to 503 
elaborate on TPI components. This will improve our understanding to which they can, or should, be 504 
addressed and how these insights translate into a company’s room for manoeuver in TPI development 505 
and implementation along the ILC.  506 
6.2 Managerial implications 507 
Several recommendations to practitioners emerge from our study, although they remain tentative due 508 
to the exploratory nature of this study. We suggest that there is good rationale for managers working 509 
on core processes to give head status to technological change and accentuate existing capabilities. 510 
Conversely, for non-core processes, giving head status to organizational change is advised in order to 511 
exploit efficiency gains from externally sourced standard technology solutions. Despite a head status 512 
being afforded to either technological or organizational change, it is important not to neglect the 513 
complementarity of both and focus on mutual adaptation to achieve congruency. These 514 
recommendations imply that awareness of existing structures, processes, and technologies, as well as 515 
their value to the firm’s core and non-core competencies, is a necessary precondition for determining 516 
the adequate structure of mutual adaptation. Finally, to address issues of uncertainty and internal 517 
resistance, managers need to ensure that changes are transparent to all relevant stakeholders. 518 
Although, it may be difficult to achieve high levels of communicability early on, we recommend close 519 
contact with operators to address changing expectations and uncertainty and to assess potential 520 
systemic impact. 521 
6.3 Limitations  522 
Our findings are based on a limited number of cases, which limits statistical generalizability. Future 523 
research should validate our results through statistical analysis. Additionally, longitudinal, 524 
participatory research could aim to refine our insights from different stakeholder perspectives and on 525 
a more granular level of the ILC.  526 
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 Table 1. Case information 665 
 666 
Case  Case background Type of process Size 
(Employees) 
Interviewees 
(Interviews) 
Interview 
hours 
1 CarCo is a global car manufacturer in the high priced luxury segment. The company’s competitive advantage 
and appropriability regime are determined by the quality of its products and production competencies. The 
information that CarCo provided related to the development and implementation of higher-order enabling 
processes. These processes use standard IT solutions to coordinate and enable all organizational processes 
ranging from idea generation to product offer. 
Enabling 100,000+  4 (7) [+SD] 10.5 
2 RailCo is the world’s leading manufacturer of braking systems for rail and commercial vehicles. The company 
has global manufacturing operations that work independently. The information that RailCo provided related 
to the development and implementation of IT-driven, enabling processes. This involves the introduction of 
externally acquired standard technology solutions, which drive efficiency. 
Enabling 20,000+ 4 (9) [+FN; +SD] 15 
3 DefCo is a global leader in non-nuclear submarines and high-level naval vessels. They have a strong focus on 
product differentiation. Production predominantly relies on skilled, manual labour rather than automated 
processes and robotic support. Nevertheless, DefCo has started to research advanced technologies to support 
production. The information that DefCo provided mainly relates to the development and implementation of 
externally acquired standard IT solutions for production. 
Enabling 8,000+ 9 (12) [+FN] 20 
4 EleCo is a global electronics company that produce switches and connectors for the automotive industry. The 
company has a high quality focus, but, due to ease of imitation, competes using a high production volume 
leveraging specific production competencies. The information that EleCo provided related to the 
development and implementation of an internally developed production technology in the company’s core 
operations.  
Core 100,000+ 9 (14) [+FN; +SD] 23.5 
5 ChasCo is a major global supplier of automotive driveline and chassis technology. The company develops and 
manufactures high quality products and has pronounced product development and production competencies. 
ChasCo provided information on the development and implementation of higher-level enabling processes 
and core production processes via externally acquired and internally developed technology respectively. 
Enabling / Core 80,000+ 7 (13) [+FN; +SD] 22.5 
+FN: additional field notes were taken during visits to manufacturing plants; +SD: company provided additional secondary data. 
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